

What Makes Offshore Wind Consultation a Success?

Lessons from South Korean and International Cases

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Contents

Executive Summary	3
Key Findings	4
Recommendations	5
1 Introduction	6
1.1 Research Background	6
1.2 Research Objectives and Scope	7
1.3 Structure of the Report and Related Reports	7
2 International Case Studies	8
2.1 United Kingdom: Legalisation of Procedures and an Integrated Framework	8
2.2 Japan: Statutory Councils and Tender-linked Consultation	13
2.3 Denmark: One-stop Permitting with Spatial Pre-coordination	17
3 Korea Domestic Cases	21
3.1 Successful Cases of Public-led and Private-led Models	21
3.2 Conflict Cases: Recurring Patterns and Lessons	30
4 Comparative Analysis: Six Factors for Success	34
4.1 Factor 1: Legalisation of Consultation and Enforcement Mechanisms	34
4.2 Factor 2: Bringing Forward the Timing of Consultation	35
4.3 Factor 3: Representation of Organisational Units and Balance Between Both Sides	35
4.4 Factor 4: Transparency of Information and Expert Support	36
4.5 Factor 5: Benefit-Sharing and Long-Term Monitoring	37
4.6 Factor 6: Integrated System Design	37
4.7 Summary: Structure Determines the Outcome	38
5 Policy Implications	40
5.1 Directions for Establishing a Consultation System Suited to the Korean Context	40
5.2 Conclusion	42

Executive Summary

One of the principal barriers to offshore wind deployment in Korea has been the lack of sufficient stakeholder consultation. In the absence of a legally mandated, integrated stakeholder consultation framework specifically for offshore wind development, in the past developers have selected sites individually and pursued project development and permitting, generating conflicts that recurred across regions and left numerous projects stalled indefinitely.

The Special Act on the Promotion of Offshore Wind Power and the Development of the Offshore Wind Industry (hereafter, the Offshore Wind Act), enacted in March 2025, fundamentally transforms this structure. The Act shifts the existing system to a public-led one with mandatory consultation as a part of the zone designation process. The question is no longer whether a framework exists, but how it is designed: how the public-private council should be constituted, when consultation should begin, and what criteria should govern consensus. These must be answered in the Enforcement Decree.

This report analyses consultation models from the UK, Japan and Denmark alongside domestic cases, deriving six structural factors that determine whether consultation works in practice. The findings were presented in advance to policy decision-makers as reference material during the drafting of the Enforcement Decree of the Offshore Wind Act. This report makes that analysis publicly available.

The central conclusion is this: structure determines outcomes. What consistently separated successful overseas cases from domestic conflicts was the presence or absence of institutional structures that enforced consultation, ensured transparency, and shared benefits.



Key Findings

Legal grounding gives consultation its force

The UK, Japan, and Denmark have each established a clear rule: without consultation, there can be no progression to the next stage of development. This stands in direct contrast to previous domestic cases, where permitting often proceeded without structured consultation.

The timing of consultation determines its nature

Consultation before investment creates an incentive to engage substantively; after investment, it can be perceived as pressure to move the project along. In the domestic cases examined in this report, consultation typically began only after permits had been granted.

Representation must be designed

Overseas models designate fishing organisations as the primary parties to consultation, with official representatives on both sides to prevent any single party from dominating. Where fishers are not represented by an association, direct engagement with individuals is also advised.

Information disclosure is a precondition for equal consultation

Continuous disclosure of project data, supported by independent expert analysis, enables evidence-based deliberation. Where information is unequally held, consultation tends to give way to mutual distrust.

Moving from compensation to benefit-sharing raises social acceptance

Linking community income to power generation output, combined with long-term monitoring, transforms residents from recipients of damage compensation into participants in shared benefit.

An integrated system, not isolated instruments, creates effectiveness

Consultation, information disclosure and monitoring must be sequentially linked as prerequisites across each project stage. The central design challenge lies less in which instruments to introduce than in how to connect them.



Recommendations

01 Enshrine the legal force of consultation in the Enforcement Decree

Council consensus should be a mandatory prerequisite for zone designation, with clear pathways specified for cases where consensus cannot be reached.

02 Bring consultation forward to before the basic design plan is finalised

The council should be established at the candidate zone selection stage, with authority to review zone suitability and adjust boundaries where necessary.

03 Reflect the legal standing of fisheries cooperatives and fishing village associations in the consultation structure

Both fisheries cooperatives and fishing village associations should be formally designated as council members, with democratic internal decision-making strengthened.

04 Establish an integrated offshore wind information platform and expert working group

A publicly accessible platform consolidating zone and fishing ground data should be developed, alongside an expert working group providing impartial technical analysis to the council.

05 Institutionalise generation-linked benefit-sharing and long-term monitoring

Benefit-sharing tied to power generation should be enshrined in law, with mandatory fisheries impact monitoring, regular council reporting, and regional coexistence plans incorporated into developer selection criteria.

06 Design the full process as an integrated system, not a set of individual measures

Each stage, from prior consultation through to zone designation, tendering, construction, and monitoring, should serve as a prerequisite for the next. Properly designed consultation is not an obstacle to projects; it is the foundation that enables them.



1 Introduction



1.1 Research Background

One of the principal barriers to the expansion of offshore wind power in Korea has been the absence of structured stakeholder consultation. Under the structure where private operators individually identified sites and pursued development, there were no legally prescribed consultation procedures. Criteria regarding who should be included in consultations and what procedures should be followed were unclear, resulting in recurring conflicts across different regions.

The Special Act on the Promotion of Offshore Wind Power and the Development of the Offshore Wind Industry (hereinafter referred to as the Offshore Wind Act), passed in March 2025, transforms this structure. It shifts to a public-led system in which the state directly designates development zones and selects operators through a tender process, whilst mandating consultation with stakeholders during the designation process. Three years after the Act's passage, individual project approaches will, in principle, no longer be permitted.

Although the Act has been passed, alone it is not sufficient and many questions remain. How should the public-private consultative body be constituted? At what stage should consultations begin? What criteria should be established for reaching consensus? These questions must be specified in the implementing regulations, and the effectiveness of the Act will depend on how these are designed. Leading nations in offshore wind power have been addressing these questions for decades, and Korea itself now has a growing number of successful and less successful examples to follow. The starting point of this report is to systematically analyse this experience and use it in the design of a consultation system suited to the Korean context.

1.2 Research Objectives and Scope

The purpose of this report is to derive success factors through an in-depth analysis of domestic and international cases of stakeholder consultation in the offshore wind sector. By comparing cases from major offshore wind countries overseas (the UK, Japan and Denmark) with domestic examples, it examines the conditions necessary for consultation to be effective.

The primary audience comprises two groups: policy-makers responsible for designing and operating the designation of development zones and stakeholder consultation within the framework of the Offshore Wind Act; and operators currently engaged in existing licensing projects. Whilst the latter are not directly subject to the Offshore Wind Act, the consultation design principles presented in this report are effective in preventing conflicts and mitigating project risks.

The core content of this report was provided in advance to policy-makers as reference material during the drafting of the Enforcement Decree, and this report compiles that content into a public document.

1.3 Structure of the Report and Related Reports

This report is structured around case studies. Chapter 2 provides an in-depth analysis of successful overseas cases by country, demonstrating how consultation models are designed and operate in each nation. Chapter 3 analyses domestic cases, categorising them into successes and cases where consultation proved less effective, and examines the outcomes and limitations of attempts to resolve conflicts. Chapter 4 identifies the key factors distinguishing success from less effective outcomes through a comparison of domestic and international cases. Finally, Chapter 5 presents policy implications based on the analysis results.

In conjunction with this report, a separate practical guide, the Designing Public-Private Councils Under Korea's Offshore Wind Act: From Subordinate Legislation to Practice, has been prepared that addresses the specific methods for designing public-private consultation bodies. Whilst this report presents a strategic direction on 'why consultation is important' and 'what' needs to be done, the separate, practical guide provides specific methods on 'how' to design and operate public-private consultation bodies. These two reports enable the simultaneous achievement of strategic understanding and practical application.



2 International Case Studies



2.1 United Kingdom: Legalisation of Procedures and an Integrated Framework

As of August 2026, the UK possesses the world's second-highest installed capacity of offshore wind and decades of project experience, second only to China. The UK's approach rests on the statutory documentation of consultation procedures and their direct linkage to the licensing system. Five elements – the SOCC (Consultation Plan), CFWG (Commercial Fisheries Working Group), CFLO/FIR (Company Fisheries Liaison Officers/Fishing Industry Representatives), KIS-ORCA/Kingfisher Bulletin (Information Platform) and FMMS (Fisheries Monitoring and Mitigation Strategy) – form the operational framework through which this linkage is maintained.

2.1.1 Legal Basis

The legal framework for offshore wind in the UK is established by the Planning Act 2008. Under this Act, offshore wind is classified as a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project, and a Development Consent Order (DCO) must be obtained before development can proceed. In this context, statutory consultation with residents and stakeholders is mandatory as a prerequisite for applying for planning permission. The key instrument for this is the Statement of Community Consultation (SOCC).

The Significance of the SOCC

The SOCC is a document in which the developer specifies in detail “with whom, when and how” consultation will take place; it must be drawn up and published prior to applying for a DCO.

The SOCC is not merely a formal requirement. After drafting the SOCC,

the developer must undergo preliminary consultation with the local government; the finalised SOCC is then published via newspaper announcements, online posting and display in public places to ensure it is easily accessible to residents. Subsequently, the developer conducts public briefings, exhibitions, and online consultations in accordance with the procedures set out in the SOCC, and compiles the feedback received and details of how it has been addressed into a Consultation Report for submission.

Legal Enforcement Mechanism

The core of the SOCC lies in its legal enforceability. When determining whether to accept a DCO application, the Secretary of State reviews the 'Adequacy of Consultation' opinion provided by the local authority, with compliance with the SOCC serving as a key criterion. If a developer fails to submit the SOCC or produces a merely formal document, the DCO application itself may be rejected.

Because non-compliance with the SOCC can result in the rejection of a DCO application, developers have a direct procedural incentive to begin consultation early and maintain a documented record of engagement.

The Hornsea Project Three Case

The Hornsea Project Three, which began public consultation in 2016 and was granted development consent in December 2020, has a consented capacity of approximately 2.4 GW and serves as a prime example of the effectiveness of the SOCC scheme. The developer, Ørsted, held more than 12 public consultation sessions between 2016 and 2018 and sent out information packs to every household in the area, detailing the project and explaining how to submit comments. As a result, over 1,600 residents attended the sessions, and more than 2,000 comments were received via online surveys and written submissions.

Crucially, specific feedback was provided on the comments submitted, and the outcomes of these consultations were incorporated into the final project design. The project received consent in December 2020, having completed the consultation process required under the SOCC framework.

Why it works

There are two reasons why the SOCC works.

First, it directly links procedural obligations to consequences. Rather than an abstract requirement to consult, the system establishes a specific condition: submission and implementation of the SOCC is a prerequisite for the DCO application, and non-compliance renders the application liable to rejection.

Second, because the SOCC is published before consultation begins, stakeholders can assess whether the developer's actual engagement conforms to the commitments set out in the document.

2.1.2 Operational Structure/Representation/Mediation Mechanisms: FLOWW, CFWG, CFLO/FIR

FLOWW, the CFWG, and the CFLO/FIR structure each address a different level of the consultation process.

FLOWW: National Consultation Framework

FLOWW (Fishing Liaison with Offshore Wind and Wet Renewables) is a national consultation framework established in 2002 and facilitated by The Crown Estate. It involves fisheries organisations, offshore renewable energy developers, government agencies, and The Crown Estate, and discusses conflicts between offshore wind and fisheries, as well as coexistence strategies. FLOWW's key output is the FLOWW Best Practice Guidance, first published in 2008, revised in 2014, and most recently updated in November 2025, which documents the principles and procedures for effective consultation between developers and fishers. This guidance subsequently serves as the benchmark for the operation of project-level CFWDs and the designation of site-level CFLOs/FIRs.

CFWG: Regular Consultation Framework

The Commercial Fisheries Working Group (CFWG) is a regular consultation framework established on a per-project basis. Where adjacent projects share the same fisheries stakeholders, a single CFWG may cover multiple projects, as with the Forth and Tay projects in Scotland. It comprises developers, fishers' representatives, local authorities and the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) in England, or the Marine Directorate in Scotland and holds regular meetings on a monthly or quarterly basis. Agenda items can include coordination of survey and construction schedules (to avoid key fishing seasons), adjustment of turbine locations/array layout (to minimise overlap with fishing grounds), securing navigation routes (to maintain existing routes), micro-siting of subsea cable routes (to minimise the risk of damage to fishing gear), establishment of safety zones, and development of a compensation methodology.

Meeting minutes are kept and can be referred to in subsequent disputes or compensation discussions.

In large-scale projects such as Hornsea and Dogger Bank, the CFWG operated continuously for several years, throughout the construction and operational phases. Indeed, in the Hornsea Project Three, some turbine locations were adjusted to reflect fishers' views, and the construction schedule was rescheduled to avoid key fishing seasons.

CFLO and FIR: On-site Liaison System

UK offshore wind projects appoint a Company Fisheries Liaison Officer (CFLO) and a Fisheries Industry Representative (FIR). The FIR, often appointed by the developer, acts as a counterpart to the CFLO and serves as a single contact point within the fishing community. FIRs are typically former fishers or fishery enforcement officers with established relationships among local fishers, enabling them to represent an unbiased view of the local fishing industry.

The key to this structure is the balance between the two sides. Having official liaison officers on both the developer's and the fishers' sides reduces the scope for either party to dominate the consultation process. The CFLO and the FIR communicate regularly on matters such as construction schedules, navigation routes, and fishing gear locations, with each serving as the designated point of contact for their respective side.

Why it works

The structure works because each level addresses a different scope of coordination. FLOWW establishes shared principles and standards at the national level. The CFWG applies these to project-specific decisions on a regular basis. The CFLO and FIR handle day-to-day communication on the ground. Because fisheries stakeholders have a designated contact at each level, concerns raised at the project level can be escalated where necessary, and decisions made nationally are applied consistently across individual projects. The regular meeting schedule maintains continuity throughout the project lifecycle, while the option to convene additional meetings allows urgent matters to be addressed as they arise.

2.1.3 Information Disclosure: Real-time Information Platform KIS-ORCA/Kingfisher Bulletin

Timely access to accurate information supports more effective fisheries consultation. KIS-ORCA maps the locations of installed offshore infrastructure including subsea cables, turbine arrays, substation platforms, and cable protection measures in a format compatible with onboard navigation plotters. The Kingfisher Bulletin is a notification service through which developers issue Local Notifications covering upcoming surveys, construction campaigns, and navigational hazards. During construction of Hornsea Three, for example, the developer issued weekly notices of operations to fishers, updated throughout the construction phase and detailing the vessels on site, guard vessel positions and the status of work in each area. Together, they provide fishers with access to the same baseline operational data as the developer, independently and in advance of any engagement.

The FLOWW Best Practice Guidance (2025) sets out expected practice on both fronts. Developers should submit positional data to KIS-ORCA for both proposed and active infrastructure, and issue notifications through the Kingfisher Bulletin within recommended minimum notice periods: 14 days for pre-installation surveys, construction campaigns, fishing gear clearance and major maintenance, and zero to 24 hours for emergency works. Whilst the guidance is voluntary best practice rather than statute, it states that deviation should occur only in exceptional circumstances and with clear justification. Fishers carry the corresponding obligation to keep their plotters updated and to monitor the Bulletin for the areas they fish.

Why it works

Access to shared information allows fishers to engage with technical details such as cable locations, survey schedules, and construction timelines on their own terms rather than through the developer alone. This supports more substantive coordination within structures such as the CFWG and through CFLO and FIR channels, as discussions can proceed from a common factual baseline rather than from information supplied by one party to the other. More broadly, the information infrastructure reflects an approach that treats potential conflicts as matters for advance coordination rather than after-the-fact dispute resolution.

2.1.4 Monitoring: Long-term monitoring and adaptive management under the FMMS



The UK has institutionalised fisheries monitoring beyond the consenting stage through dedicated plans: Mitigation, Monitoring and Communication Plan in Scotland (formerly known as the Fisheries Management and Mitigation Strategy, or FMMS), and the Fisheries Liaison and Co-Existence Plan (FLCP) in England. These ensure that the potential impact on fisheries is continuously monitored and managed throughout both the construction and operational phases. For the purposes of this report, the following description draws on the Scottish model, referred to here as the FMMS for brevity, as a representative example.

Structure of the FMMS

The FMMS is a document that outlines the fisheries mitigation and monitoring strategy. The developer submits the FMMS when applying for a permit, and it includes the following:

- Mitigation measures: engagement protocols, adjustment of construction schedules, reduction of construction areas, securing of navigation routes, establishment of safety zones
- Monitoring plan: Continuous tracking of fishing activities, changes in fishing grounds and the distribution of fish stocks
- Compensation procedures: estimated damage and compensation criteria
- Adaptive management: Updates to mitigation measures based on monitoring results

Adaptive management is a stated principle of the FMMS. Where monitoring reveals impacts that were not anticipated at the consenting stage, the framework allows the FMMS to be updated to introduce additional mitigation measures. This treats impact management as an ongoing obligation rather than a one-off assessment concluded at the consenting stage.

Marine Directorate Approval and Inspection

The FMMS is approved by the Marine Directorate in Scotland. If the FMMS is not being properly implemented, the Marine Directorate may intervene and demand corrective action. This provides an external check on whether consultation commitments are being implemented.

Why it works

First, consultation confined to the planning stage alone is insufficient to build durable stakeholder trust, as it leaves open the question of whether commitments will be honoured once operations commence. The FMMS addresses this by extending the monitoring obligation into the operational phase.

Second, the structure's credibility rests on independent verification rather than developer self-assessment. The Marine Directorate approval ensures that monitoring results are subject to scrutiny by parties independent of the project proponent, lending the process a degree of objectivity that self-reporting alone cannot provide.

2.1.5 Implications: Legalisation of Procedures and System Design

The UK case shows that fisheries consultation is most effective when responsibility is distributed across multiple levels, each with a defined scope and designated participants. This offers the following implications for the design and operation of Korea's public-private consultation model for offshore wind power.

First, as with the SOCC system, the consultation process itself should be legally documented, shifting the standard from an unverifiable claim that consultation occurred to a demonstrable record of how, with whom, and on what matters it was conducted.

Second, a multi-tiered structure should be implemented rather than a single body. The UK separates roles according to the level of discussion and spatial scope through a structure comprising the FLOWW, CFWG and FLO. Furthermore, participation should be encouraged based on representativeness and roles, as seen with the CFLO/FIR, rather than engaging on an individual basis.

Third, consultation outcomes should be linked to ongoing monitoring. The FMMS and CFWG should ensure that consultation content is translated into mitigation, monitoring and remedial measures, extending the process through to the implementation and operation stages.

Fourth, the development of a digital information infrastructure warrants serious consideration. An integrated offshore information platform, such as KIS-ORCA and the Kingfisher Bulletin, should be developed to enable fishers, local residents and researchers to access the same data in real time.

Fifth, consultation must be designed as a system. A key implication of the UK model is that major consultation mechanisms do not function in isolation but are operated in an integrated manner. Korea's consultation architecture should similarly be designed so that legal enforceability, timing, information disclosure, ongoing communication, and long-term monitoring operate as connected stages rather than separate measures.

2.2 Japan: Statutory Councils and Tender-linked Consultation

When Japan enacted the 'Act on the Utilisation of Marine Areas for Renewable Energy' in 2019, it made statutory consultation bodies mandatory in the procedure for designating offshore wind power promotion zones. The state takes the lead in site selection, and consultation is a prerequisite for zone designation. Because this structure is closely analogous to Korea's Offshore Wind Act, Japan serves as a direct point of reference.

2.2.1 Legal Foundations

The 2019 Act established a three-stage designation process through which sea areas are classified as Preparation Zones, then Promising Zones, and finally Promotion Zones eligible for public tender. The Act specifies that designation must satisfy certain conditions, including that the project must not significantly hinder fisheries, meaning that the

relationship between offshore wind and fisheries is a formal consideration from the earliest stages of site selection rather than a later mitigation matter. A statutory consultation council is formed at the Promising Zone stage, before an area is designated as a Promotion Zone¹, so that stakeholders can provide input before key decisions on zone boundaries and development conditions are made.

Structure of the Statutory Consultative Body

Japan's statutory consultation body brings together representatives from government (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; and local authorities), the private sector (fishers, local residents, and environmental groups), and independent experts in marine affairs, the environment, fisheries, and energy.

Substantive decision-making authority

The council discusses topics including the adjustment of the boundaries of the promotion zone to minimise overlap with fishing grounds, fisheries impact assessments and mitigation measures, a review of the results of the environmental impact assessment, measures to contribute to the local economy, and criteria and procedures for fisheries compensation.

While the council does not itself exercise final administrative authority over zone designation, its role within the procedure carries substantive weight. Where fisheries or local acceptance issues raised in the council remain unresolved, designation of a Promotion Zone may be postponed or subject to further review, and some candidate areas have been excluded from designation due to overlaps with fishing zones. The Act provides that council members are to respect the matters on which agreement has been reached, giving the council a strong referential function in the government's subsequent decisions on zone designation and tender criteria.

Decisions are made by consensus rather than majority vote. Where full agreement proves difficult, conditions are attached to the designation to enable agreement, such as requiring clear fisheries compensation criteria or scheduling construction to avoid peak fishing seasons.

Why it works

The 2019 Act changed the conditions under which developers consult. Prior to the Act, consultation was voluntary and its absence carried no direct procedural consequence. Under the current framework, the council's findings shape whether and how a zone proceeds to designation, meaning that areas where consultation has not made meaningful progress are unlikely to advance to the tender stage. Fishers participate through fisheries cooperatives rather than as individuals, which allows internally coordinated positions to be brought to the council and reduces the time spent consolidating fragmented views during the consultation process itself. A comparable function is served by FIRs in the UK model.

¹ Under Japan's Act on the Utilisation of Sea Areas for Renewable Energy, candidate waters advance through three stages: preparation areas (early-stage candidates identified with prefectures), promising areas (where the statutory council is convened and detailed wind and seabed surveys begin), and promotion zones (formally designated areas in which occupancy rights are put to tender).

2.2.2 Linkage with the tender evaluation

A distinctive feature of the Japanese model is that the results of the consultation are directly reflected in the selection of operators. The outcomes of council discussions feed into the public tender process. Bids are scored on a 240-point scale divided equally between supply price and project feasibility. Within the feasibility component, coordination and coexistence with fisheries is an explicit evaluation criterion alongside broader measures for local economic contribution. Developers are required to present a fisheries consultation and coexistence plan as part of their bid, reflecting the content discussed in the council. Under the evaluation criteria applied in Rounds 2 and 3, coordination and coexistence with surrounding sea routes and fisheries is allocated 10 points of the 240-point total, within a 40-point block that also covers local and national economic ripple effects and coordination with relevant authorities. The June 2026 revision of the auction guidelines retains the equal 120-point split between price and feasibility, and the 40-point weighting for local coordination and economic contribution.

In the case of the waters off Oga City, Katagami City and Akita City in Akita Prefecture, designated as a Promotion Zone in September 2022, the tender evaluation criteria included measures for coexistence with the fishing industry, incorporation of stakeholder consultation results, and plans to address fisheries impacts. This illustrates how council discussions are structurally connected to the subsequent operator selection process rather than serving as a standalone procedural step.

Why it works

Requiring developers to present a fisheries coexistence plan as part of their tender bid means that consultation outcomes carry a direct procedural consequence at the selection stage. This is structurally different from the UK model, where the SOCC establishes a minimum threshold for consultation process rather than linking consultation quality to competitive evaluation. Whether the current weighting (10 points for fisheries co-existence specifically, within the 40-point local coordination and ripple-effect block) is sufficient to function as a meaningful incentive remains an open question, particularly given that supply price has historically been the dominant determinant of tender outcomes in practice.

2.2.3 Implementation Management

Following operator selection, agreed consultation outcomes are incorporated into both the occupation plan and the public tender guidelines issued for each promotion zone. The tender guidelines may specify the direction of cooperation with the fishing industry and local communities, the methods and scope of fisheries impact assessments, and matters concerning coexistence with local communities. The selected operator is required to carry out the project in accordance with the approved plan and to report regularly on implementation progress to the council. This includes the results of environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring, and post-project surveys. Where the reports raise issues requiring further consultation or information sharing, these are addressed through the council. This structure means the council retains a formal role in overseeing implementation after the operator has

been selected, rather than being dissolved at the designation stage.

Once a Promotion Zone has been designated and an operator selected, the operator conducts implementation-level negotiations directly with the relevant local fisheries cooperative on matters such as turbine layout, route and fishing ground adjustments, construction and operational scheduling, measures to minimise interference with fishing activity, and compensation arrangements. The specific terms of fisheries impact mitigation and compensation are typically determined at this implementation level, building on the broader principles established by the council.

Why it works

Formalising consultation outcomes as conditions of both the occupation plan and the tender guidelines means that commitments made during the council process carry legal obligations beyond the selection stage. The requirement to report back to the council also preserves the council's function after operator selection, rather than treating it as a one-time procedural step that concludes at the designation stage. The implementation-level negotiation between the operator and the fisheries cooperative also ensures that broad principles are translated into specific arrangements suited to local conditions.

2.2.4 Implications

The Japanese model offers four lessons for Korea.

First, the sequence of consultation, designation, and public tender should be maintained in that order. Korea's Offshore Wind Act stipulates this sequence, but it will only be effective if the Enforcement Decree specifies the timing of the consultative body's formation, the consultation period, and the criteria for reaching agreement.

Second, the scope and authority of the consultative body should be clearly defined in the Enforcement Decree. Japan's experience suggests that consultation is more substantive when the council's role in the designation process is explicitly specified, including the conditions under which designation may be delayed or subject to additional requirements. Ambiguity about what the council can and cannot determine tends to undermine the quality of engagement on both sides.

Third, consultation quality should be reflected in the tender evaluation. Korea should specify fisheries consultation plans, local employment targets, and compensation standards as explicit criteria in developer selection, and establish a mechanism for monitoring implementation after selection.

Fourth, Japan's experience suggests that participation through organised fisheries bodies, rather than individual fishers, supports more efficient consultation by allowing internally coordinated positions to be presented to the council. How representational structures for fisheries stakeholders are designed in Korea's Enforcement Decree will have practical implications for the pace and quality of consultation.

Japan has been operating this system since 2019 and has refined it

through experience. The structural similarities with Korea's Offshore Wind Act mean that Japan's accumulated practice in specifying council powers, tender evaluation criteria, the role of fisheries organisations, and implementation management offers directly applicable reference points for Korea's Enforcement Decree.

2.3 Denmark: One-stop Permitting with Spatial Pre-coordination

Denmark manages the relationship between offshore wind and fisheries through a sequential structure linking Marine Spatial Planning (MSP), Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and licensing conditions, with the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) functioning as a one-stop permitting authority. Rather than establishing a dedicated consultation body, Denmark builds consultation and compensation requirements into licensing conditions, producing a de facto recurring consultation structure between developers and the Danish Fishermen's Producer Organisation (DFPO).

Under the Danish Fisheries Act, fishers who normally operate in an affected area are entitled to compensation for lost income, which the developer must negotiate. In practice, negotiations have been conducted collectively through the fishing industry's representative organisation rather than vessel by vessel, as in the Horns Rev and Kriegers Flak projects.

2.3.1 Legal Basis and Permitting Structure

Offshore wind in Denmark is governed primarily by the Renewable Energy Act (VE-loven), the Electricity Act, and the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, with the DEA serving as the principal permitting authority for tendering, EIA, and the issuing of preliminary survey, construction, and operation permits. For designated tender sites, the Danish state carries out preliminary site investigations covering seabed, wind, environmental and geophysical conditions before tendering, and makes the results publicly available to all bidders. Conducting these surveys once, under public authority, spares the fishing community and the marine environment the repeated disturbance of multiple developers surveying the same waters, and reduces uncertainty for bidders.

Marine Spatial Planning as Pre-emptive Conflict Resolution

Denmark published its first Marine Spatial Plan in 2021 under the Marine Spatial Planning Act, coordinating offshore wind, fisheries, shipping lanes, and protected areas within a single planning framework. Candidate areas for offshore wind are designated at the national level, with their relationship to existing fishing grounds and protected zones reviewed before development zones are confirmed. Fisheries organisations, local authorities, environmental groups, and residents participate in the planning process through public hearings and written submissions, and some areas have been adjusted or excluded on fisheries or environmental grounds.

By identifying and excluding the most important fishing grounds and

sensitive marine habitats at the planning stage, MSP prevents the most contentious conflicts from arising at the project level. The plan also designates broad development zones that remain open to other uses, including fishing, until a designated activity is actually developed, allowing the plan to be adjusted as new information emerges rather than foreclosing options before sufficient information is available.

The result is that by the time a specific project enters the consultation phase, fundamental questions of site suitability have already been narrowed at the planning level, and discussions can focus on specific mitigation and coexistence measures rather than on whether the site itself is appropriate. In effect, MSP relocates conflict from the project timeline, where delay is costly and positions are entrenched, to the planning stage, where alternatives still exist.

Environmental Impact Assessment and Public Hearings

All large-scale offshore wind projects must undergo Environmental Impact Assessment, including scoping, publication of the draft EIA, and a public hearing process through which residents, fishers, local authorities, and environmental groups submit comments. Submitted comments can shape permit conditions such as route adjustments, construction timing, and the designation of protected areas, and the final EIA report serves as a key basis for the DEA's permit decision.

The EIA and public hearing procedures are operated as part of the licensing process rather than as separate consultation exercises. For the Thor project, an eight-week public consultation took place following the publication of the draft plan and the draft Strategic Environmental Assessment. Following the consultation and further investigations, the DEA adjusted the project site boundaries from 440 km² to 286 km². This illustrates that public hearings in the Danish system can produce substantive changes to project parameters rather than serving as procedural validation.

2.3.2 Operating Structure

The Danish operating structure combines centralised one-stop permitting at the national level with project-level negotiation between developers and fisheries representatives. The DEA oversees tendering, permitting, and EIA, gathering input from fishers, residents, local authorities, and NGOs through public hearings at each stage.

The DEA's guidance document "Offshore Wind and Fisheries in Denmark" sets out the procedure through which a developer must reach agreement with fishers on fisheries impacts in order to obtain a generation permit. Loss assessment is conducted through an independent evaluation, on the basis of which compensation levels are negotiated.

In practice, this operates as a two-level structure. At the strategic level, MSP, tender design, and environmental guidelines establish the overall direction. At the project level, developers and the DFPO form negotiation tables to address construction zones and timing, cable installation, safety zones, and compensation. Although Denmark does not have a standing consultative body comparable to the UK's CFWG, the combination of

licensing conditions and recurring negotiation practice has produced what is in effect a project-level consultation structure.

2.3.3 Representativeness: Organisations and Institutions as the Primary Units

Denmark's representation structure is anchored in organisations and institutions rather than individual participants.

On the fisheries side, the DFPO and regional fishers' associations act as the formal counterparties for submitting comments through licensing and MSP processes and for negotiating compensation with developers. On the developer side, project companies bear responsibility for fulfilling permit conditions, and some projects appoint a Fisheries Liaison Officer from an external consultancy to coordinate between survey and construction schedules and fishing activity. On the administrative side, the DEA and related agencies conduct review and oversight functions including permit condition setting, EIA and MSP review, and assessment of the adequacy of compensation and mitigation measures.

This structure means that consultation and negotiation outcomes are recorded as the formal positions of organisations and institutions rather than as individual opinions, providing a documented basis for subsequent reference in the event of disputes.

2.3.4 Mechanisms for Local Acceptance: Compensation, Bonuses, and Co-existence

Denmark does not rely solely on individual compensation negotiations to secure local acceptance, but operates through institutionalised mechanisms.

The property value compensation scheme (Værditabsordningen) allows owners of nearby residential buildings to claim compensation where renewable energy installations cause property value depreciation above a defined threshold, with the developer bearing the cost. The VE-Bonus scheme, introduced through amendments to the Renewable Energy Act, provides residents within a defined radius (proportional to turbine height) with an annual cash bonus tied to the facility's output. Neither scheme is specific to offshore wind, but together they establish a national principle that the burdens of renewable energy expansion warrant corresponding economic compensation.

Compensation and Co-existence Pilots

Compensation for documented fisheries losses is determined through independent consultancy assessment of reductions in catch, revenue, and equipment damage, followed by negotiation between the developer and the DFPO on compensation levels and on construction or route adjustments. During survey and construction phases, advance information on work locations and schedules is provided through navigational notices, electronic charts, and on-site liaison to reduce conflicts at sea.

The Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm hosts a co-location pilot study project growing seaweed and mussels within the wind farm area, with the first harvest reported in 2024. This remains research in character rather

than a standing institutional arrangement, but it indicates one direction in which offshore wind and fisheries activity may be combined rather than separated.

2.3.5 Implications

The Danish case offers four lessons for Korea.

First, the relationship between strategic planning, project licensing, and on-site coordination should be structured as connected stages with defined roles. In Denmark, MSP addresses the broad spatial question of where offshore wind should be sited and which areas should be preserved for fishing or protection; project-level EIA and licensing conditions specify mitigation and compensation obligations; and on-site coordination during construction manages fishing and construction conflicts. Korea's consultative body should be designed with a clear view of which stage of decision-making it addresses, and how it connects to the planning, licensing, and monitoring processes operating in parallel.

Second, the Danish case shows that recurring consultation can be institutionalised without a standing consultative body. Denmark imposes consultation and compensation requirements as permit conditions, and the repeated negotiations between developers and the DFPO have produced what is in effect a regular consultation structure. Korea's consultative body should not be treated as a one-time institution; mechanisms are needed to ensure that consultation outcomes continue to be updated through the licensing, project implementation, operational, and post-operational stages.

Third, representation through organisations and institutions, rather than through individuals, supports clearer accountability over time. In Denmark, the DFPO, the DEA, and project companies appear repeatedly as institutional actors with defined roles, making it possible to trace who committed to what, on whose behalf. This becomes important when conflicts re-emerge later. Korea's consultative body should specify at the design stage how each main group is represented, how representatives are recommended or elected, what terms and conflict-of-interest standards apply, and where formal liaison points exist for each sector.

Fourth, compensation, mutual benefit, and co-existence should be addressed within a single framework rather than as separate measures. Denmark's property value compensation, VE-Bonus, fisheries compensation negotiations, and co-location pilots are different policy instruments, but together they reflect a common question of how burdens and benefits should be distributed across the renewable energy transition. Korea's consultative body should be designed to address compensation, regional benefit programmes, and longer-term co-existence within an integrated frame, with consultation outcomes connected to planning, agreements, and monitoring rather than treated as standalone settlements.



3 Korea Domestic Cases



3.1 Successful Cases of Public-led and Private-led Models

There are also domestic cases where consultation has been used to resolve conflicts and advance projects. Local Authority A used a public-led public-private consultative body to finalise a site, whilst Region B reached a consensus through a private-led approach, supported by a neutral secretariat and expert assistance. Both cases are presented in anonymised form; the account below is confined to documented procedures and recorded outcomes, drawing on project documentation, meeting records and survey results produced in the course of each case.

3.1.1 Local Authority A: Public-led Model

Case A describes a local authority that, under the previous permitting framework prior to the enactment of the Offshore Wind Act, implemented stakeholder engagement procedures in parallel with site selection before any preliminary zone had been formally designated. The area is characterised by active fishing activity, with the interests of neighbouring residents and fishers closely intertwined, making conflict likely from the earliest stages of site identification. In the surrounding waters, multiple private developers had earlier pursued wind measurement installations and licences independently of one another, and this experience of overlapping projects preceded the shift to a public-led approach.

Consequently, in Case A, the local authority focused on securing public acceptance by conducting stakeholder communication and preliminary surveys in parallel from the very start of its public site selection process.

3.1.1.1 Proactive Communication and Identification of Preliminary

Zones at the Site Selection Stage

The most notable feature of Case A is that fishers' opinions were incorporated into the site selection process before candidate sites were determined. Rather than the local authority first determining candidate sites and then explaining them, a procedure was implemented whereby areas with minimal opposition were narrowed down through site preference surveys and workshops.

Site Preference Survey

The site preference survey was conducted among 12 representative fishers' organisations. Questionnaires and site maps were distributed to each organisation, and respondents were asked to mark areas of approval or disapproval. The results were compiled into opinion maps for each organisation and synthesised to identify preferred areas and areas to avoid.

Workshops and Council Submission

The survey results were reviewed again during workshops, where discrepancies between organisations, areas of conflict, and omitted areas were addressed and the draft list of candidate sites adjusted. Following technical verification by a specialist engineering firm, the list of preliminary candidate sites was finalised and submitted as an agenda item to the public-private consultative council. The final site proposal was designed to undergo reporting and resolution procedures within the public-private consultative council.

Why it works

By incorporating stakeholder input from the site selection stage, the process built acceptance into site identification rather than seeking it afterwards. Rather than presenting predetermined sites to stakeholders, the preference survey and workshop structure allowed areas of minimal opposition to be identified first, reducing the potential for conflict before candidate sites were formally proposed. Combining fishers' views with technical review allowed social acceptability and technical feasibility to be assessed together rather than sequentially, so that sites carrying significant stakeholder opposition could be filtered out before technical investment was made. Submitting the final site proposal to the council before administrative confirmation meant that the selection outcome was subject to formal consultation before being settled, rather than consultation serving as a post-hoc validation of a decision already made.

3.1.1.2 Outsourcing to Specialist Agencies and Separation of Roles

Case A outsourced the set of tasks required to secure public acceptance, spanning surveys, communication programmes and benefit-sharing design, to a specialist agency for integrated management. A structure has been established in which the acceptability specialist agency, the survey agency, and the technical review body participate with distinct roles. This structure is designed to maintain public interest, expertise and neutrality across different components of the process.

Integrated Management of Acceptability Tasks

Case A advanced the investigation, communication and mutual benefit

tasks necessary to secure public acceptance in parallel rather than sequentially. A council alone finds it difficult to adequately address local conflict factors, fisheries impacts, residents' demands and benefit-sharing measures simultaneously. By jointly managing the social impact survey, site preference survey, social dialogue, preliminary fisheries impact survey, and benefit-sharing and local mutual benefit tasks within a single framework, the scope of stakeholder engagement is broadened beyond what formal council meetings can accommodate.

Task-specific surveys and analyses

The preliminary social impact survey covers stakeholder identification, opinion gathering, power dynamics analysis and requirements derivation. The preliminary survey on fishing industry impacts examines the current state of the fishing industry, fishing patterns, impact pathways, and strategies for avoidance and mitigation. The benefit-sharing and regional mutual benefit task involves developing resident-participatory benefit-sharing models and mutual benefit measures. In other words, the survey targets and objectives are clearly distinguished for each task.

Ensuring Public Interest and Neutrality

Specialised agencies are responsible for surveys and analysis, whilst local authorities participate as the administrative driving force; the results of each task are reviewed through the council and public consultation procedures. This structure ensures that acceptability is not determined solely by the local authority but is pursued based on surveys and consultation.

Why it works

Case A operates the acceptability task as a single integrated system. First, site selection, social impact, fisheries impact, benefit-sharing and mutual growth plans are addressed together rather than being treated separately.

Second, the subjects and objectives of each task are clearly defined, enabling the comprehensive acquisition of necessary information. Third, outsourcing to specialist agencies places investigations and analyses with bodies whose methods and results can be reviewed independently of the administration, reducing the scope for perceptions of administrative bias.

3.1.1.3 Information Disclosure and Ongoing Communication System

Case A expanded information disclosure and public consultation both within and outside formal meetings. It operated a combination of deliberative hearing sessions, public briefings, workshops, public-private consultative councils, and a website and social media channels. A structure was established involving repeated cycles of information sharing, opinion gathering, review and re-discussion.

Offline Communication Programmes

Case A organised deliberative hearing sessions, public briefings, workshops, round-table discussions, seminars and forums for a diverse range of stakeholders, including fishers, residents, relevant organisations,

civil society and private sector operators; among these, eight deliberative listening sessions were held over a two-week period, with standardised question-and-answer records. Through these, the project details and survey results were disclosed, and a wide range of opinions were gathered regarding securing public acceptance, responding to the Special Act and measures for regional mutual benefit. By running various communication programmes in parallel, the project broadened its points of contact with stakeholders.

Online Information Disclosure

An online information disclosure system is also in operation. The official website is structured into sections covering renewable energy, legislation and policy, project guidance, statistics and current status, and participation and communication. It is designed to provide ongoing access to information such as participation in site preference surveys, benefit-sharing models, project progress, and the results of public briefings. The website, promotional videos and social media channels are presented not merely as promotional tools, but as means of providing project information and opportunities for participation on an ongoing basis.

Why it works

First, it has broadened the reach to stakeholders through various channels. Second, information was disclosed before, after, and outside of meetings to improve accessibility. Third, in addition to formal meetings, supplementary interviews, round-table discussions and online feedback sessions were conducted in parallel to gather opinions that had not previously been taken into account.

3.1.1.4 Regional Analysis and Formulation of Mutual Benefit Measures

Case A specifies mutual benefit measures based on regional diagnostics and stakeholder surveys. The research was conducted with a diverse range of participants so as to reflect the region's characteristics and needs.

Preliminary Social Impact Survey

The preliminary social impact survey serves to identify regional issues and sources of conflict, and to assess social sensitivities and ripple effects. It is also used as foundational data for devising response strategies for each stakeholder group and establishing a long-term conflict management system. This process involves first clarifying the regional context and conflict structure, which form the basis for discussions on mutual benefit.

Preliminary Survey of Fishing Industry Impacts

The Preliminary Fisheries Impact Survey examines the current state of fisheries, fishing patterns and impact pathways to review measures for preventing, avoiding and mitigating damage. This serves as the basis for compensation negotiations whilst also helping to formulate concrete plans for the coexistence of fisheries.

Profit-sharing and Mutual benefit measures

The benefit-sharing and mutual benefit measures involve designing resident-participatory benefit-sharing models and region-specific mutual

benefit measures. Case A reviewed participation methods and the distribution structure among participating residents, neighbouring residents and fishers, and established participation models suited to local characteristics. Furthermore, the integrated sector-specific plans covering fisheries coexistence, education, care and welfare, and mid-to-long-term project management strategies were integrated into a mutual benefit measures master plan.

Why it works

Case A expanded the discussion on mutual prosperity from a compensation-centred approach to the formulation of region-specific plans. By simultaneously conducting regional analysis, assessing the impact on fisheries, and designing benefit-sharing schemes, it was possible to specifically reflect the region's characteristics and key needs. This ensured that the mutual benefit measures did not remain limited to short-term support but served as a foundation for addressing the region's medium to long-term challenges.

3.1.1.5 Implications

Case A connected the functions required to secure public acceptance, including site review, stakeholder engagement, investigation and analysis, and discussions on mutual benefit, within a single integrated framework rather than treating them as separate procedures. The prior incorporation of fishers' views into site selection, the systematic linkage of survey results to council deliberation, and the grounding of mutual benefit discussions in region-specific evidence collectively illustrate the value of structural coherence. In Korea's public-led offshore wind programme, this sequenced and interconnected design approach should be established as a precondition.

3.1.2 Region B: Private-sector-led + Neutral Secretariat Model

Case B is an example where concerns regarding fisheries, landscape and tourism, vessel navigation, and environmental impacts were raised from the outset of the offshore wind project. Traditional fishing grounds overlapped with the proposed project site and subsea cable corridors, and the local economy depends substantially on beaches and coastal scenery. Within the local community, there was accordingly a high likelihood of escalating conflict due to a combination of factors, including a lack of information, distrust of consultation procedures, and issues regarding stakeholder representation.

In response, in Case B, the consultation framework was established, and key issues were managed through the phased implementation of public briefings, consultation committees, information disclosure and discussions on mutual benefit. Case B remains in progress; the account below therefore concerns the design of its consultation process and the results observed to date, rather than a completed outcome.

3.1.2.1 Neutral Operation and an Independent Consultation Framework Operating Entity

A distinctive feature of Case B was that the operation of the consultation committee was entrusted to a neutral third-party body. While various

forms of public-private consultative councils operate domestically, concerns about neutrality persist where project operators are perceived to manage the consultation process directly. To mitigate these issues, Case B outsourced the management of the consultation to a separate body, entrusting this body with the overall operation of the consultation, including meeting preparation, agenda coordination, distribution of materials and the drafting of minutes.

Neutral moderation

An external moderator was also appointed to ensure neutrality in the proceedings. In Case B, a professor from a local university with both an understanding of the local community and expertise in communication served in this role. This served as a mechanism to manage the balance of contributions, mediate emotional conflicts and organise the issues into a form suitable for negotiation in a situation of acute conflict. The appointment of a moderator combining local knowledge with professional expertise was intended to strengthen procedural trust in the negotiation process.

Why it works

The project operator was responsible for providing information and implementation commitments, the third-party operating body managed procedural arrangements, and the moderator ensured balanced participation and clarified points of contention during meetings. This division of roles reduced the perception that the consultation was being influenced by a single entity.

This division meant that the entity responsible for managing consultation procedures was distinct from the entity with a direct stake in the project outcome. While the operating body was appointed by the developer, entrusting procedural management to a separate organisation with a defined neutral role created a structural buffer that reduced the perception of direct developer control over the consultation process.

3.1.2.2 Committee Selection System and Ensuring Representativeness

In Case B, the selection of members was treated as a core stage in the design of the council. Rather than through simple recommendations or customary allocation methods, the composition of the council was determined on the basis of in-depth interviews and stakeholder analysis conducted by academic institutions commissioned by the neutral operating body. This was designed to ensure the neutrality of the selection process and to minimise distrust arising from the perception that members were selected unilaterally by the operator.

Stakeholder Analysis

The academic institution broadly identified direct and indirect stakeholders within the region. Focus group interviews covering some thirty stakeholder groups were conducted to investigate each group's willingness to participate, their stance on the issue, their influence, networks, and key demands. During this process, an analysis was conducted to determine the respective positions of fishers, residents, young people, civic groups, local organisations, the administration, and expert groups, and to identify who needed to be included for the council to possess substantive

representativeness.

Shortlisting

An initial shortlist of candidates was drawn up based on the results of in-depth interviews and the stakeholder analysis. Final candidates were then confirmed based on the criteria of representativeness, expertise, communication skills, motivation to participate and balance. The stance analysis was applied at this stage: representatives of supportive, opposed and neutral positions were included in deliberate balance within the final composition. Where it can be clearly articulated which group each member represents and by what criteria they were selected, the outcomes of the consultation are more likely to carry public trust.

Why it works

The committee selection system in Case B was designed to allow for the objective verification of representativeness.

First, in-depth interviews conducted by academic institutions and stakeholder analysis served as the basis for identifying participants more objectively and ensuring that the council's composition was not biased towards any particular group.

Second, the procedure distinguishing between the initial pool of candidates and the final shortlist enhanced the acceptability of the committee selection. By broadly reviewing the candidate pool and then refining it according to criteria, a structure was established that allowed the final selection results to be explained.

3.1.2.3 Information Disclosure and Ongoing Communication System

Case B operated a system of information disclosure and opinion gathering that extended beyond the meetings themselves, covering both before and after the meetings. A structure was established that linked advance sharing, post-meeting disclosure and ongoing communication. This was an operational approach designed to reduce the disconnect between internal council discussions and external public opinion within the local community.

Pre-meeting Sharing

Prior to meetings, agenda items and related materials were shared in advance to allow committee members to review them beforehand. This enhanced the level of understanding and focus during discussions on the day.

Post-meeting Disclosure

Following meetings, the outcomes and minutes were made public, and a process was established to receive further questions and supplementary comments. Online channels were utilised not merely for announcements, but as a means of ongoing communication for questions, explanations and feedback. To accommodate stakeholders with limited access to information, offline distribution of materials was also carried out in parallel.

Gathering Feedback

Individual committee members conveyed the meeting content to their affiliated organisations and local communities and gathered internal feedback to bring back to the council. This structure functioned as a

conduit, reconnecting council discussions to the wider local community.

Why it works

Case B operated the process of disclosing information and soliciting opinions as a single, integrated flow.

First, by combining pre-meeting sharing, post-meeting disclosure and ongoing opinion gathering, the content of the discussions was spread to the local community rather than remaining confined to the small number of attendees.

Second, the establishment of a feedback mechanism between committee members and local organisations allowed discussions within the council to be reconnected with the views of the local community.

Third, the structure for verifying necessary information and relaying feedback helped to reduce misunderstandings and rumours, thereby enhancing trust in the council.

3.1.2.4 Local Diagnosis and Formulation of Mutual Benefit Measures

Case B developed mutual benefit measures on the basis of a local diagnosis and a survey of residents' perceptions. These measures were organised into sector-specific tasks, addressing both short-term benefits and medium- to long-term regional development objectives.

Regional Diagnosis

Using the Local Capacity Index (LCI), an instrument provided by a third-party organisation that benchmarks a locality against local governments nationwide across around fifty indicators, the council analysed the region's strengths and weaknesses in areas such as demographic structure, economic activity, living infrastructure, social safety, health and the environment. This identified strengths in the environment and living infrastructure, alongside weaknesses in population growth potential and economic activity. Based on these findings, the council reviewed long-term tasks such as youth employment, industrial linkages, tourism enhancement, and education and talent development.

Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys

The questionnaire survey was used to quantitatively assess perceptions of offshore wind power, expected benefits, concerns and residents' willingness to participate. Group in-depth interviews with around forty participants were used to gain a more detailed understanding of the specific needs, acceptance conditions and preferred types of mutual benefit for each group. This enabled the needs of residents and stakeholders to be identified through both numerical data and qualitative feedback.

Derivation of Sector-Specific Mutual Benefit Measures

The mutual benefit measures were categorised into areas such as responses to fishing industry impacts, the local economy and tourism, employment, education and talent development, and the environment and infrastructure. These were subsequently divided into short-term implementation tasks and medium- to long-term strategic tasks. This process helped to clarify the scope of the discussions and establish priorities.

Formulation of an Implementation Plan

In Case B, after organising the mutual benefit agenda, the roles of each stakeholder and the methods of securing funding were also reviewed. This allowed for the specification of who would be responsible for implementing the mutual benefit measures and what resources would be used to do so.

Why it works

Case B transformed the mutual benefit measures into actionable tasks. First, as a regional assessment and a survey of residents' perceptions were carried out first, the council was able to identify challenges affecting the entire region, rather than merely repeating the demands of a specific group.

Second, by dividing the mutual benefit plan into sectors and further categorising them into short-term and medium-to-long-term tasks, the council was able to address both immediate issues and long-term initiatives simultaneously.

Third, by reviewing the roles of each stakeholder and the methods of securing funding, a structure was established to ensure that the mutual benefit plan could be translated into a concrete implementation plan.

3.1.2.5 Implications

Case B illustrates that a public-private consultative body can function as a genuine operational model when the right structural conditions are in place. The four elements established in Case B, namely operational neutrality through a third-party secretariat, transparent, criteria-based member selection, an ongoing information cycle before and after meetings, and region-specific mutual benefit planning grounded in evidence, do not operate in isolation but as an integrated framework. For the design of offshore wind public-private consultation bodies in Korea, these elements should be treated as a package rather than adopted selectively.

3.1.3 Common features of successful cases

Despite their contrasting implementation modes, one public-led and the other private-led, Cases A and B share the same structural conditions that allowed consultation to function effectively. Equally, the two cases resolved the same underlying challenges through meaningfully different means, making them complementary rather than competing models.

Substantive Consultation Functions

Both cases ensured that consultation outcomes fed directly into decision-making, but through different mechanisms. Case A embedded stakeholder input into the site selection process itself, linking fishers' survey responses to candidate site adjustment and formal council resolution. Case B structured the council to systematically address contested issues, ensuring that deliberation on key disputes and mutual benefit arrangements occurred within the consultation framework rather than outside it.

Ensuring Neutrality and Expertise

Both cases introduced neutrality safeguards but addressed different

dimensions of the problem. Case A focused on the credibility of information by outsourcing survey and analysis functions to specialist agencies, thereby reducing concerns about administrative bias in the data. Case B focused on the credibility of the process itself, separating the operational and facilitation roles and placing both in the hands of parties independent of the developer. The former secures informational trust; the latter secures procedural trust.

Representative Composition of Participants

Both cases built a prior basis for answering the question ‘who participates and why’. Case A did so through direct consultation with 12 representative fishing organisations via a site preference survey, establishing participatory breadth at the outset. Case B did so through a stakeholder mapping exercise conducted by an academic institution, followed by a phased selection process against defined criteria, establishing the explainability of each member’s inclusion.

Transparent Information Disclosure and Continuous Communication

Both cases extended information flow beyond the formal meeting setting, but through different architectures. Case A prioritised breadth of reach, running multiple offline and online channels in parallel to maximise stakeholder touchpoints. Case B prioritised continuity of the information cycle: pre-meeting sharing, post-meeting disclosure, and a feedback loop through council members back to their constituent organisations. These represent complementary approaches to the same problem of information accessibility.

A Mutual Benefit Structure Beyond Compensation

Both cases moved mutual benefit discussions beyond one-off financial compensation but structured that shift differently. Case A integrated the social impact baseline survey, fisheries impact assessment and benefit-sharing design into a single commissioned workstream, enabling the mutual benefit framework to be built directly on evidence. Case B sequenced regional diagnostics and resident perception surveys first, then used those findings to organise sector-specific mutual benefit agendas with short-term and medium-to-long-term task distinctions. The common thread is that mutual benefit planning was grounded in local evidence rather than generic frameworks.

What the two cases together demonstrate is not a single template but a set of conditions: substantive consultation authority, structural neutrality, representative participation, accessible information, and evidence-based mutual benefit planning. These conditions can be met through different design choices depending on the local context and implementation mode.

3.2 Conflict Cases: Recurring Patterns and Lessons

3.2.1 Conflict Cases

Local Authority 1

Local Authority 1 has been pursuing large-scale offshore wind power development since 2018. Although permits for more than 15 power

generation projects were applied for, the process proceeded without public hearings, leading to strong opposition from fishers. In 2020, the local authority signed a mutual benefit agreement, but the agreement was soon terminated.

Although a public-private consultative body was launched in November 2020, the problems persisted. With power generation operators spread across more than 10 locations and fishing methods varying widely, issues of fairness arose, such as compensation negotiations being conducted with only some fishing groups. Some groups demanded compensation amounting to billions of won as a condition for ceasing operations, whilst others declared they would not participate in the consultative body.

Local Authority 2

In Local Authority 2, several private developers began conducting individual wind and weather surveys from 2018. Between 2020 and 2021, the development licences of many developers were put on hold due to issues regarding community acceptance, or fishers protested through press conferences even after the licences had been approved.

In August 2021, the local authority attempted to establish a public-private consultation body, but conflicts arose among fishers' groups over the issue of representation. Conflicts between fishers and developers also persisted. In 2022, the local authority head was replaced and expressed a negative stance on offshore wind power; however, the developer maintained that the project could not be halted due to investment costs, leading to a deadlock.

Local Authority 3

In Local Authority 3, multiple private developers have been pursuing offshore wind power development since 2018. Although companies began wind and wave measurements and obtained power generation licences, fishers strongly protested, claiming that the licensing process had proceeded without prior public notice or explanation. The fishers argued that the planned project area overlapped with existing fishing grounds, which would deal a direct blow to their livelihoods. Subsequently, permits for other developers were either partially approved or put on hold due to a lack of communication with local residents.

In 2021, some developers held a signing ceremony for an agreement on fishers' acceptance, but the fishers refused to sign, arguing that the process had proceeded without sufficient discussion. The fishers expressed strong opposition, including by submitting petitions to central government ministries, and the developers' power generation licences were subsequently suspended one after another. Local Authority 3 has formed a new public-private consultative body and is holding deliberative listening sessions to resolve the conflict.

3.2.2 Common Causes of Conflict

A synthesis of the conflict cases in the three local authorities and prior domestic research suggests that the conflicts can be attributed to four structural causes.



Lack of Procedural Legitimacy

The most fundamental cause is the 'decide first, inform later' approach. Developers unilaterally select sites, public briefings are conducted merely as a formality, and stakeholders are not granted substantive decision-making power. This initial procedural unfairness has continuously eroded trust in all subsequent stages, including mutual benefit agreements, compensation negotiations and the operation of public-private consultative councils.

Information Asymmetry and Distorted Representation

Institutional-level information asymmetry has deepened as project-related information has been concentrated within certain groups or provided informally. Where administrative bodies arbitrarily designated consultation partners or concentrated negotiating authority in specific individuals, recurring disputes occur over legitimate representation and who holds the authority to speak on behalf of affected communities. Even when public-private councils or mutual benefit agreements were established, cases continued to arise where the legitimacy of the agreements was not recognised or where they were subsequently nullified.

Infringement of Livelihoods and Limitations of the Compensation Structure

The reduction of fishing zones, the degradation of fishing grounds and restrictions on navigation routes were perceived by fishers as a real threat to their livelihoods. However, there were limitations in that, as the criteria for assessing damages and the compensation system were not clearly defined by law, reliance on administrative guidelines was necessary. In a negotiation structure limited to financial compensation, long-term livelihood stability at the community level or ecosystem restoration were not considered, and as compensation was concentrated on certain groups, this even led to internal conflicts among fishers.

The formalisation of consultation bodies

Even when consultation bodies are established, if they lack substantive authority or are led by local authorities and project developers, there is a tendency for stakeholders to experience consultation as a formality in which their participation carries no genuine weight. In some regions, efforts have been made to mediate conflicts through public-private consultative bodies, and new initiatives such as community funds and resident-participatory benefit-sharing models are emerging. However, unless these initiatives are linked to legal binding force, it is difficult to guarantee their sustainability.

3.2.3 Lessons from Domestic Cases

Common Features of Successful Cases

A clear distinction emerges when comparing successful cases (Local Authorities A and B) with conflict cases (Local Authorities 1, 2 and 3).

- Granting substantive authority to the council (influence over site selection and zone designation)
- Ensuring neutrality (public interest commissioners, neutral secretariat,

expert advisory panels)

- Transparent disclosure of information
- Representation of organisational units (Fisheries Cooperatives, Fishing Villages)

Common features of conflict cases

- Lack of procedural legitimacy (proceedings carried out without consultation)
- Unclear representation (contested legitimacy over who speaks for affected communities)
- A mere formality (no authority, opinions not taken into account)
- Lack of transparency in the distribution of benefits

Key Lessons

The lesson to be learnt from domestic cases is that structure determines outcomes. It is not a matter of selecting the right people, but of creating the right structure. If a structure is designed that empowers the council, ensures its neutrality and provides transparent disclosure of information, the likelihood of success increases. Conversely, if a council is established merely as a formality and procedures are bypassed, the likelihood of conflict increases.



4 Comparative Analysis: Six Factors for Success



4.1 Factor 1: Legalisation of Consultation and Enforcement Mechanisms

Overseas Examples

In the UK, the submission of a SOCC is mandatory prior to a DCO application under Section 47 of the Planning Act 2008. Failure to submit an adequate SOCC exposes the DCO application to rejection at the acceptance stage. Japan has made the operation of statutory councils mandatory under the Act on the Use of Marine Areas for Renewable Energy. In practice, zones where council-level agreement has not been reached do not proceed to designation. Denmark has made EIA public hearings mandatory under its Environmental Impact Assessment Act, operated as part of the DEA's permitting process.

Common Features

All three countries have made consultation a statutory prerequisite. In each case, the legal framework removes developer discretion: consultation is a procedural prerequisite, not a voluntary commitment, and its absence carries direct consequences for the progression of the project.

Domestic Comparison

Local Authority A, a successful case, designed its system so that applications for concentrated development zones cannot be submitted without council consensus. In contrast, in cases of conflict, permits were processed without consultation, thereby amplifying the conflict. Although Korea's Offshore Wind Act also stipulates a public-private council, it will only be effective if the Enforcement Decree specifies council consensus as a mandatory condition for zone designation.

Key Points

Legalising consultation entails more than the establishment of a council; it implies a structural enforcement mechanism in which the absence of consultation blocks progression to the next stage. The UK model, in which failure to submit an adequate SOCC exposes the DCO application to rejection, and the Japanese model, in which council agreement operates in practice as a precondition for zone designation, both exemplify this approach.

4.2 Factor 2: Bringing Forward the Timing of Consultation

Overseas Examples

In Japan, the council is formed before the stage of designating promotion zones. Consultation is completed before the site is finalised. Denmark's MSP involves fishers and residents in the spatial planning stage to pre-coordinate suitable areas for wind power. The UK's SOCC must be submitted and implemented prior to applying for a DCO.

Common Features

In all cases, consultation is brought forward to before the decision-making stage. When consultation is positioned before investment decisions are made, developers have a genuine incentive to engage substantively with stakeholders, since the outcome of that engagement can still influence the project. By contrast, where consultation follows investment commitments, it tends to function as a mechanism for securing acceptance of decisions already taken, with limited scope for meaningful adjustment to project design to minimise any potential impacts.

Domestic Comparison

In all the conflict cases, attempts at consultation were made after authorisation had been granted. When consultation takes place after a developer has already been selected and investment committed, the practical scope for substantive adjustment is severely constrained. In contrast, Local Authority A shifted to a public-led approach, forming a consultation panel prior to site selection and finalising the site through the panel's consensus.

Key Points

Bringing forward the timing of consultation changes the nature of the consultation. Post-facto consultation tends towards acceptance management, seeking endorsement for decisions already taken, whereas pre-consultation enables genuine stakeholder participation in the decision-making process itself. Early consultation also reduces sunk-cost pressure on all parties and widens the range of feasible alternatives before positions become entrenched. Consultation must begin at the site selection and spatial planning stages, as is the case in Japan and Denmark.

4.3 Factor 3: Representation of Organisational Units and Balance Between Both Sides



Overseas Examples

In the UK, the FIR is designated as the representative for the fishing community, whilst the FLO acts as the liaison for the developer. Having official representatives on both sides ensures balance. In Denmark, the DFPO represents the fishing industry as an organisational unit and negotiates with the developer. In Japan, the Fisheries Cooperative participates in consultations with legal standing as the body responsible for managing fishing rights.

Common Features

In all cases, the organisations, rather than individual fishers, are the negotiating parties. If individual fishers participate in a fragmented manner, consolidating positions becomes far more difficult and consensus is rarely achievable within practical timeframes. When an organisation forms a collective will through internal coordination, negotiations proceed efficiently. Furthermore, by institutionalising a balance between the two sides (as in the UK, with FLO and FIR), it can mitigate the structural conditions that might otherwise allow one party to dominate the process.

Domestic Comparison

In the successful case of Region B, a neutral secretariat was established to ensure balance between the two sides. In cases of conflict, representativeness was unclear. In Local Authority 1, with over 10 operators and diverse fishing methods, the question of legitimate representation was frequently contested. As only some groups participated in the consultations whilst others did not, this led to disputes regarding fairness.

Key Points

Designating fisheries cooperatives and fishing village associations as the formal negotiating parties, rather than relying on ad hoc individual participation, provides a basis for coordinated, democratically accountable representation. Establishing equivalent formal representation on both sides of the consultation, along the lines of the UK's FLO/FIR model, helps prevent any single party from dominating the process.

4.4 Factor 4: Transparency of Information and Expert Support

Overseas Examples

KIS-ORCA in the UK publishes turbine and cable locations, and the Kingfisher Bulletin publishes notices to mariners as well as construction schedules. In Japan, independent experts sit on the statutory councils, supporting evidence-based deliberation on technical matters.

Common Features

All treat information disclosure as a prerequisite for meaningful consultation. If developers monopolise information, projects are particularly susceptible to concerns about information concealment. Equal consultation is only possible when both parties have access to the same information. Furthermore, expert support enables evidence-based deliberation rather than positional bargaining.

Domestic Comparison

In the successful Case B, a neutral secretariat disclosed all materials, and the project management advisory group answered technical questions. In cases of conflict, there was severe information asymmetry. Fishers reported not having received adequate information, whilst operators maintained they had conducted briefings; neither party's account was accepted by the other, reflecting a fundamental breakdown in communicative trust.

Key Points

Information platforms such as KIS-ORCA should be established, or council minutes and materials should be published on the website. Furthermore, expert working groups should be established under the council to discuss technical issues scientifically.

4.5 Factor 5: Benefit-Sharing and Long-Term Monitoring

Overseas Examples

Denmark's VE-Bonus pays an annual cash bonus calculated on the basis of installed capacity, power generation volumes and electricity prices, making residents beneficiaries. The UK's FMMS and FLCP track and address the impact on fisheries through long-term monitoring during the construction and operational phases. Japan includes coordination with local stakeholders and contribution to the local economy in its tender evaluation (40 of the 240 available points), making the quality of consultation a competitive factor.

Common Features

All shift from 'compensation' to 'benefit-sharing'. Rather than one-off compensation, they share benefits over the long term and guarantee the fulfilment of commitments through monitoring. A structure that positions residents as active beneficiaries of the energy transition rather than as recipients of damage compensation, as in Denmark's VE-Bonus, enhances social acceptability.

Domestic Comparison

Successful cases discussed local funds and resident-participatory investment. In cases of conflict, compensation criteria were unclear, and as only some received compensation, controversies over fairness arose. Furthermore, in several instances, concerns arose that commitments made during the consultation process were not upheld once development had commenced, eroding longer-term trust in the process.

Key Points

The institutionalisation of generation-linked benefit-sharing (along the lines of the VE-Bonus) and long-term monitoring mechanisms similar to the FMMS is needed to ensure that commitments made at the outset will be sustained throughout the project lifecycle rather than concluded at the point of initial compensation.

4.6 Factor 6: Integrated System Design



Overseas Examples

In the UK, SOCC, CFWG, KIS-ORCA and FMMS are organically linked. The planning stage (SOCC), construction stage (CFWG and KIS-ORCA) and operational stage (FMMS) operate as a single system. In Japan, the statutory council, competitive tendering and the fisheries cooperative complement one another. The council handles consultations on zone designation, the tendering process ensures quality competition, and the cooperative is responsible for efficiency and legitimacy.

Common Features

All are designed as integrated systems rather than individual schemes. SOCC alone is insufficient, and CFWG alone is insufficient. Multiple elements are linked to create a structure in which consultation is a non-negotiable prerequisite for each subsequent stage. As in Japan, the sequence of consultation, zone designation and competitive tender is enforced, ensuring that each stage serves as a prerequisite for the next.

Domestic Comparison

In the success story of Local Authority A, the Public-Private Council, site selection and the application for a concentrated development zone were linked. In cases of conflict, individual systems were operated sporadically, lacking integration. Although briefings were held, they were not linked to the council, and whilst compensation negotiations took place, there was no monitoring.

Key Points

The system must be designed so that statutory enforceability, information disclosure, expert support and long-term monitoring operate as a single integrated framework centred on the public-private consultation body. Rather than introducing individual schemes, the system must be designed to determine how these elements are interconnected.

4.7 Summary: Structure Determines the Outcome

Key Lessons

A clear pattern emerges when comparing the six factors.

Factor	Overseas Success Stories	Domestic Conflict Cases
Legalisation	No further steps can be taken without consultation	Permit processing proceeds without consultation
Timing	Consultation prior to site selection	Attempt to consult after authorisation
Representativeness	Organisational unit + balance between both sides	Unclear representativeness

Factor	Overseas Success Stories	Domestic Conflict Cases
Transparency	Disclosure of information + expert support	Information asymmetry
benefit- sharing	Long-term benefit-sharing + monitoring	One-off rewards, mistrust
Integration	System-wide integration	Sporadic operation

The pattern that emerges across the six factors is consistent: the determining variable is not the goodwill of individual actors but the design of the structural conditions within which they operate. Where those conditions are well designed, with clear legal enforceability, early timing, representative participation, transparent information, equitable benefit-sharing, and systemic integration, consultation functions effectively.

5 Policy Implications



5.1 Directions for Establishing a Consultation System Suited to the Korean Context

This chapter presents policy directions for applying the six success factors derived from comparative analysis to Korea. It addresses the strategic direction regarding why consultation is important and what needs to be changed. Specific design methods for ‘how’ to constitute and operate public-private consultation councils are covered in detail in a separate practical guide, the ‘Designing Public-Private Councils Under Korea’s Offshore Wind Act: From Subordinate Legislation to Practice’.

Improvements to the Legal Framework: Ensuring the Legal Binding Force of Consultation

The Offshore Wind Act stipulates the establishment of a public-private consultation body. However, the Enforcement Decree must clearly stipulate that the body’s consensus serves as a prerequisite for zone designation and licensing.

Three provisions warrant particular attention in the drafting of implementing regulations. First, agreement within the public-private consultation body must be explicitly stated as a prerequisite for the designation of a development zone. Second, specific procedures must be laid down for situations where agreement cannot be reached, such as the granting of a mediation period, arbitration procedures, and the suspension of zone designation. Third, a mechanism is required whereby an independent body can assess whether the consultation process met the required standard of substantive engagement. The UK’s ‘Statement of Adequacy of Consultation’ system serves as a reference model.

Adjusting the Timing of Consultation: Linking Zone Designation with

Prior Consultation

The Enforcement Decree must specify the timing for establishing the public-private consultation council at the stage of selecting candidate zones. The council should be designed to have the authority to review the suitability of candidate zones, coordinate overlaps with fishing zones, and amend zone boundaries where necessary.

This also has implications for existing licensed projects. Even where a licence has already been obtained, strengthening stakeholder consultation prior to the commencement of construction reduces project risk in the long term. Even for post-authorisation projects, structuring engagement as a genuine process of joint adjustment rather than a formality can help reduce the risk of protracted conflict. It also lowers the likelihood of costly redesigns, permitting delays, and litigation later in the project lifecycle.

Clarifying Consultation Bodies: Strengthening the Legal Status of Fisheries Cooperatives and Fishing Villages

The Enforcement Decree should explicitly designate the Fisheries Cooperative and the Fishing Village Association as formal members of the public-private consultation council, and their legal status as entities managing fishing rights should be reflected in the consultation structure. At the same time, democratic decision-making within the cooperatives must be strengthened to ensure that decisions reflect the will of the majority of members, rather than being made arbitrarily by cooperative representatives.

Establishing Information Infrastructure: Platforms and Expert Support

Two types of information infrastructure are required. First, an integrated offshore wind information platform modelled on KIS-ORCA. An online platform must be established that comprehensively displays the location of development zones, turbine layouts, subsea cable routes, construction schedules and the distribution of fishing grounds, ensuring that fishers, local residents and researchers have access to the same data.

Second, an expert working group should be established under the public-private consultative body to provide impartial analysis on technical issues such as the impact on fisheries and the environment. This will ensure that stakeholders are not excluded from access to expert advice.

Institutionalising Benefit-sharing: From Compensation to Coexistence

Moving beyond one-off financial compensation towards structural benefit-sharing arrangements is essential. Benefit-sharing should be understood broadly to include local employment, supply-chain participation, and regional economic, environmental and social value creation, rather than financial transfers alone. First, benefit-sharing linked to power generation should be enshrined in law to create a structure that ensures continuous benefit-sharing throughout the project's operational period. Second, long-term monitoring should be institutionalised, requiring the operator to continuously monitor the impact on fisheries during the construction and operational phases and to report regularly to the council. By applying the principle of adaptive management, under which additional mitigation

measures are taken based on monitoring results, the framework signals to stakeholders that impact management is a continuous obligation rather than a matter concluded at the point of initial compensation. Third, mutual benefit measures plans must be included in the criteria for selecting project operators, with evaluation criteria reflecting plans for consultation with the fishing industry, local employment targets, the proportion of local business participation, and the establishment of local funds.

Integrated System Design

The five directions outlined above will have limited effectiveness if introduced in isolation. A linked structure must be established across the entire process, from preliminary consultation to zone designation, operator selection, construction management and operational monitoring, in which each stage serves as a prerequisite for the next. The core of this structure is that zone designation is impossible without consultation, operator selection is impossible without zone designation, and failure to carry out monitoring will result in a demand for corrective action. The task is not merely to introduce individual schemes, but to design an integrated system that coordinates them into a coherent whole.

5.2 Conclusion

The key lesson of this report is that structure determines outcomes.

The common feature of successful overseas cases was not the particular individuals or organisations involved, but rather a structure that enforced early consultation, ensured transparency, and shared benefits. Similarly, the common feature of domestic conflict cases was not the fault of specific individuals, but structural problems such as the absence of consultation procedures, unclear representation and information asymmetry.

The 2025 Offshore Wind Act presents an opportunity to transform this structure. However, legislation alone is not sufficient. For the law to function effectively on the ground, the implementing regulations must specify the council's authority, the timing of its formation, the criteria for reaching agreement, the scope of information disclosure, the method of benefit-sharing, and the monitoring procedures. For existing licence holders, the six consultation design principles outlined in this report also serve as practical guidelines for preventing conflict and reducing project risks.

Consultation is not an obstacle that delays projects. Properly designed consultation should be viewed as critical project infrastructure, reducing uncertainty, improving investment confidence, and supporting timely project delivery.

By utilising the strategic direction of this report alongside the specific design methods outlined in the practical guide, Korea's offshore wind sector can be better positioned to advance on a foundation of coexistence. Ultimately, the purpose of consultation is not simply to resolve conflicts, but to improve the quality, legitimacy, and long-term durability of public decision-making.

Ocean Energy Pathway

About Ocean Energy Pathway

Ocean Energy Pathway accelerates global offshore wind growth through programmes which support the energy transition, enhance marine ecosystems and empower local communities. We provide expert, independent support to governments and key decision makers to fast-track offshore wind worldwide. Through collaboration with leaders in policy, industry, and conservation, we help shape sustainable solutions for the long-term growth of offshore wind. Ocean Energy Pathway owns the offshore wind POWER Library, in collaboration with Climate Policy Radar, to help policymakers easily find curated reports and policies related to offshore wind. Headquartered in the UK, we work in Australia, Brazil, Colombia, India, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam with ongoing projects in several other countries.

<https://oceanenergypathway.org/>



About Korea Environmental Policy and Administration Society

The Society has collaborated closely with both central and local governments in the formulation and implementation of policies and institutional frameworks regarding the environment, energy, and climate change. This has been achieved through the planning and identification of policy agendas, the execution of commissioned research projects, and the provision of technical support and consultancy.

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
About Root Energy

Root Energy is a global social enterprise (B Corp) that works with local communities to drive the expansion of renewable energy and strengthen community acceptance. At offshore wind and other renewable energy project sites, we support the formation and operation of governance structures such as public-private councils based on social impact

assessments and stakeholder analysis, design deliberation and public consultation processes, and operate a community funding platform that enables local residents to invest directly and share in the benefits. Through these activities, we are building sustainable partnerships between government, local authorities, developers, and local communities.

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